sn22.155

Sāvatthinidānaṁ.

“Kismiṁ nu kho, bhikkhave, sati, kiṁ upādāya, kiṁ abhinivissa sakkāyadiṭṭhi uppajjatī”ti?

Bhagavaṁmūlakā no, bhante, dhammā …pe…

“rūpe kho, bhikkhave, sati, rūpaṁ upādāya, rūpaṁ abhinivissa sakkāyadiṭṭhi uppajjati.

Vedanāya sati …

saññāya sati …

saṅkhāresu sati …

viññāṇe sati, viññāṇaṁ upādāya, viññāṇaṁ abhinivissa sakkāyadiṭṭhi uppajjati.

Taṁ kiṁ maññatha, bhikkhave,

rūpaṁ niccaṁ vā aniccaṁ vā”ti?

“Aniccaṁ, bhante”.

“Yaṁ panāniccaṁ …pe…

api nu taṁ anupādāya sakkāyadiṭṭhi uppajjeyyā”ti?

“No hetaṁ, bhante”.

“Vedanā …

saññā …

saṅkhārā …

viññāṇaṁ niccaṁ vā aniccaṁ vā”ti?

“Aniccaṁ, bhante”.

“Yaṁ panāniccaṁ …pe…

api nu taṁ anupādāya sakkāyadiṭṭhi uppajjeyyā”ti?

“No hetaṁ, bhante”.

“Evaṁ passaṁ …pe…

nāparaṁ itthattāyāti pajānātī”ti.

Chaṭṭhaṁ.

At Sāvatthī.

“Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does substantialist view arise?”

“Our teachings are rooted in the Buddha. …”

“When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, substantialist view arises.

When feeling …

perception …

choices …

consciousness exists, because of grasping consciousness and insisting on consciousness, substantialist view arises.

What do you think, mendicants?

Is form permanent or impermanent?”

“Impermanent, sir.” …

“But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would substantialist view arise?”

“No, sir.”

“Is feeling …

perception …

choices …

consciousness permanent or impermanent?”

“Impermanent, sir.” …

“But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would substantialist view arise?”

“No, sir.”

“Seeing this …

They understand: ‘… there is nothing further for this place.’”